Subjectivists about practical normativity hold that an agent’s favoring and disfavoring attitudes give rise to practical reasons. On this view, an agent’s normative reason to choose vanilla over chocolate ice cream ultimately turns on facts about what appeals to her rather than facts about what her options are like attitude-independently. Objectivists—who ground reasons in the attitude-independent features of the things we aim at—owe us an explanation of why it is rational to choose what we favor, if not because favoring is (...) a source of reasons. My aim in this paper is to supply such a story. The proposal is roughly that when an agent cannot base her choices on her judgments about what she has most reason to do, structural rationality extends to her a license to choose something just because she favors it, without imbuing favoring with the authority of a normative reason. (shrink)

In this paper, I will attempt to develop and defend a common form of intuitive resistance to the companions in guilt argument. I will argue that one can reasonably believe there are promising solutions to the access problem for mathematical realism that don’t translate to moral realism. In particular, I will suggest that the structuralist project of accounting for mathematical knowledge in terms of some form of logical knowledge offers significant hope of success while no analogous approach offers such hope (...) for moral realism. (shrink)

In this article, I discuss a trivialization worry for Hartry Field’s official formulation of the access problem for mathematical realists, which was pointed out by Øystein Linnebo (and has recently been made much of by Justin Clarke-Doane). I argue that various attempted reformulations of the Benacerraf problem fail to block trivialization, but that access worriers can better defend themselves by sticking closer to Hartry Field’s initial informal characterization of the access problem in terms of (something like) general epistemic norms of (...) coincidence avoidance. (shrink)

This paper is a defense of moral evidentialism, the view that we have a moral obligation to form the doxastic attitude that is best supported by our evidence. I will argue that two popular arguments against moral evidentialism are weak. I will also argue that our commitments to the moral evaluation of actions require us to take doxastic obligations seriously.

It’s sometimes suggested that we can (in a sense) settle the truth-value of some statements in the language of number theory by stipulation, adopting either φ or ¬φ as an additional axiom. For example, in Clarke-Doane (2020b) and a series of recent APA presentations, Clarke-Doane suggests that any Σ01 sound expansion of our current arithmetical practice would express a truth. In this paper, I’ll argue that (given a certain popular assumption about the model-theoretic representability of languages like ours) we can’t (...) know ourselves to have any such freedom. (shrink)

Concentration of the world’s wealth in the hands of a few, corporate owners as heads of state – these are facts that lend plausibility to Marx' pronouncements. Yet, how should we evaluate his ideas from today’s vantage point?

The idea that knowledge can be extended by inference from what is known seems highly plausible. Yet, as shown by familiar preface paradox and lottery-type cases, the possibility of aggregating uncertainty casts doubt on its tenability. We show that these considerations go much further than previously recognized and significantly restrict the kinds of closure ordinary theories of knowledge can endorse. Meeting the challenge of uncertainty aggregation requires either the restriction of knowledge-extending inferences to single premises, or eliminating epistemic uncertainty in (...) known premises. The first strategy, while effective, retains little of the original idea—conclusions even of modus ponens inferences from known premises are not always known. We then look at the second strategy, inspecting the most elaborate and promising attempt to secure the epistemic role of basic inferences, namely Timothy Williamson’s safety theory of knowledge. We argue that while it indeed has the merit of allowing basic inferences such as modus ponens to extend knowledge, Williamson’s theory faces formidable difficulties. These difficulties, moreover, arise from the very feature responsible for its virtue- the infallibilism of knowledge. (shrink)

Abstract In his discourses on ‘the lily of the field and the bird of the air,’ Kierkegaard presents faith as the best possible response to our precarious and uncertain condition, and as the ideal way to cope with the insecurities and concerns that his readers will recognize as common features of human existence. Reading these discourses together, we are introduced to the portrait of a potential believer who, like the ‘divinely appointed teachers’—the lily and the bird—succeeds in leading a life (...) that is full of care, but free of worry. Such a portrait, we claim, echoes Kierkegaard’s portrait of the knight of faith in Fear and Trembling . In this essay we suggest that faith, as characterized in the ‘lily and bird’ discourses, is a kind of existential trust that would allow us to overcome worry, while remaining wholeheartedly engaged in the finite realm of our cares and concerns. We claim that Kierkegaard’s goal in these discourses is not to belittle our earthly cares, but to invite us to develop a modified attitude toward all that we are susceptible to worry about. Content Type Journal Article Category Article Pages 1-19 DOI 10.1007/s11153-011-9322-5 Authors Sharon Krishek, Department of Philosophy, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Jerusalem, Israel Rick Anthony Furtak, Department of Philosophy, Colorado College, Colorado Springs, CO, USA Journal International Journal for Philosophy of Religion Online ISSN 1572-8684 Print ISSN 0020-7047. (shrink)

The paper argues that knowledge is not closed under logical inference. The argument proceeds from the openness of evidential support and the dependence of empirical knowledge on evidence, to the conclusion that knowledge is open. Without attempting to provide a full-fledged theory of evidence, we show that on the modest assumption that evidence cannot support both a proposition and its negation, or, alternatively, that information that reduces the probability of a proposition cannot constitute evidence for its truth, the relation of (...) evidential support is not closed under known entailment. Therefore the evidence-for relation is deductively open regardless of whether evidence is probabilistic or not. Given even a weak dependence of empirical knowledge on evidence, we argue that empirical knowledge is also open. On this basis, we also respond to the strongest argument in support of knowledge closure. Finally, we present a number of significant benefits of our position, namely, offering a unified explanation for a range of epistemological puzzles. (shrink)

In this paper I will draw attention to an important route to external world skepticism, which I will call confidence skepticism. I will argue that we can defang confidence skepticism (though not a meeker ‘argument from might’ which has got some attention in the 20th century literature on external world skepticism) by adopting a partially psychologistic answer to the problem of priors. And I will argue that certain recent work in the epistemology of mathematics and logic provides independent support for (...) such psychologism. (shrink)

Since Benacerraf’s ‘What Numbers Could Not Be, ’ there has been a growing interest in mathematical structuralism. An influential form of mathematical structuralism, modal structuralism, uses logical possibility and second order logic to provide paraphrases of mathematical statements which don’t quantify over mathematical objects. These modal structuralist paraphrases are a useful tool for nominalists and realists alike. But their use of second order logic and quantification into the logical possibility operator raises concerns. In this paper, I show that the work (...) of both these elements can be done by a single natural generalization of the logical possibility operator. (shrink)

Teaching Internship is an integral journey for pre-service teachers, providing a platform to apply academic knowledge in the workplace. However, emotional experiences are prevalent during the internship, posing challenges for pre-service teachers. Consequently, this study aims to understand the emotional experiences of pre-service teachers during their internship and assess how it impacts their performance. The current study employed a qualitative method, adhering to a multiple case study design. Ten (10) fourth-year elementary pre-service teachers from Immaculate Conception College of Balayan Inc. (...) were selected using purposive sampling technique. Then thematic analysis was utilized to analyze the data. Results revealed that participants experienced both positive and negative emotional experiences that challenge their self-confidence, time management, teaching abilities, and relationship with cooperating teachers and students. These results indicate that emotional experiences are highly evident during teaching internship. With this, the suggested advocacy plan in this study proposes interventions such as seminars, workshops, and tours to enhance the emotional resilience, emotional support, and emotional management of pre-service teachers. Furthermore, future research is advised to utilize diverse methodological techniques and include a larger sample of pre-service teachers from various majors to encompass broader perspectives on the discussed topic, building upon the findings of the current study. (shrink)

Harman and Lewis credit Kripke with having formulated a puzzle that seems to show that knowledge entails dogmatism. The puzzle is widely regarded as having been solved. In this paper we argue that this standard solution, in its various versions, addresses only a limited aspect of the puzzle and holds no promise of fully resolving it. Analyzing this failure and the proper rendering of the puzzle, it is suggested that it poses a significant challenge for the defense of epistemic closure.

This note points out a conflict between some common intuitions about metaphysical possibility. On the one hand, it is appealing to deny that there are robust counterfactuals about how various physically impossible substances would interact with the matter that exists at our world. On the other hand, our intuitions about how concepts like MOUNTAIN apply at other metaphysically possible worlds seem to presuppose facts about ‘solidity’ which cash out in terms of these counterfactuals. I consider several simple attempts to resolve (...) this conflict and note they all fall short. (shrink)

Most contemporary political science researchers are advocates of multimethod research, however, the value and proper role of qualitative methodologies, like case study analysis, is disputed. A pluralistic philosophy of science can shed light on this debate. Methodological pluralism is indeed valuable, but does not entail causal pluralism. Pluralism about the goals of science is relevant to the debate and suggests a focus on the difference between evidence for warrant and evidence for use. I propose that case study research provides evidence (...) for use through providing information that bears on the applicability of causal generalizations and risk assessment. (shrink)

Mathematical knowledge and moral knowledge (or normative knowledge more generally) can seem intuitively puzzling in similar ways. For example, taking apparent human knowledge of either domain at face value can seem to require accepting that we benefited from some massive and mysterious coincidence. In the mathematical case, a pluralist partial response to access worries has been widely popular. In this paper, I will develop and address a worry, suggested by some works in the recent literature like (Clarke-Doane, 2020 ), that (...) connections between ought facts and action prevent us from giving a similarly pluralist response to moral access worries. (shrink)

Naturwissenschaften, Mathematik und Logik waren für Nelson von zentraler Bedeutung. Er pflegte bereits als Jugendlicher intensive Kontakte zu Naturwissenschaftlern und Mathematikern. Dadurch erhielt er Anregungen, die von Anfang an seine philosophischen Ansätze beeinflussten. Inspiriert von der Kant-Fries’schen Philosophie und der Axiomatik der Mathematik, konzipierte Nelson seine Philosophie als exakte Wissenschaft. Wie Kant und Fries betrachtete Nelson die Suche nach den allgemeinen Prinzipien der Naturwissenschaften als Hauptaufgabe der Naturphilosophie. Ergebnis dieser kritischen Analyse ist ein System von metaphysischen Grundsätzen der Naturwissenschaft. Nelson (...) übernimmt Kants Lehre von den Grundsätzen des reinen Verstandes. Keine empirisch gefundene Gesetzmäßigkeit könne diesen Grundsätzen widersprechen. Für die Gesetze der Newton’schen Mechanik hätten, so meint Nelson, Kant und Fries diesen Nachweis erbracht. Deshalb formulierte Nelson das sogenannte Postulat der Mechanistik, gemäß dem alle Naturerscheinungen auf mechanische Vorgänge zurückgeführt werden können. Das starre Festhalten an diesem Postulat veranlasste ihn zur Ablehnung bedeutsamer physikalischer Konzeptionen (z. B. des auf der Elektrodynamik basierenden Relativitätsprinzips, des Nahwirkungskonzepts und des Atommodells). Das „Relativitätsprinzip der Elektrodynamik“ lehnte er mit dem Argument ab, es verhindere die Anwendung der dritten Analogie der Erfahrung, da es den Verzicht auf den Begriff der Gleichzeitigkeit von Naturerscheinungen erzwinge. Eine kritische Nelson-Rezeption muss der Historizität etlicher Thesen Nelsons Rechnung tragen, aber zugleich die Bedeutsamkeit von Kernaussagen Nelson’scher Naturphilosophie im Hinblick auf die modernen Naturwissenschaften untersuchen. Das ist auch die Zielrichtung des vorliegenden Beitrages. Der erste Teil beleuchtet Nelsons wissenschaftliches Umfeld. Einerseits wird untersucht, welche Wissenschaftler Nelson beeinflussten, andererseits soll dargestellt werden, welcher Personenkreis an der Fortentwicklung der Nelson’schen Naturphilosophie beteiligt war. Beispielhaft sollen daran anschließend zwei Themenbereiche aus seinem reichhaltigen Werk disktiert werden, denen besonders im Hinblick auf aktuelle philosophische Diskussionsschwerpunkte Bedeutsamkeit zukommt. Im zweiten Teil werden nämlich Nelsons Betrachtungen zum Verhältnis von Freiheit und Naturnotwendigkeit sowie seine Unterscheidung zwischen wissenschaftlicher und ästhetischer Naturbetrachtung besprochen. Der Beitrag beansprucht nicht, die Rezeptionssgeschichte und den Inhalt von Nelsons Naturphilosophie sowie die aktuelle Bedeutsamkeit seiner Thesen im Detail darzustellen aufzuarbeiten. Vielmehr geht es darum, Ansätze für eine zeitgemäße Interpretation Rezeption aufzuzeigen und anhand von Beispielen zu erörtern. (shrink)

Timothy Williamson has famously argued that the principle should be rejected. We analyze Williamson's argument and show that its key premise is ambiguous, and that when it is properly stated this premise no longer supports the argument against. After canvassing possible objections to our argument, we reflect upon some conclusions that suggest significant epistemological ramifications pertaining to the acquisition of knowledge from prior knowledge by deduction.

There are few indulgences academics can crave more than to have their work considered and addressed by leading researchers in their field. We have been fortunate to have two outstanding philosophers from whose work we have learned a great deal give ours their thoughtful attention. Grappling with Stephen Yablo’s, and Juan Comesaña’s comments and criticisms has helped us gain a better understanding of our ideas as well as their shortcomings. We are extremely grateful to them for the attentiveness and seriousness (...) with which they have considered our arguments and to philosophical studies for giving us this opportunity. Given the substantive difference between the two response papers, there is not much beyond sincere gratitude that we can covey to them jointly. We will therefore address them in turn. (shrink)

In this article, we reflect on our experiences teaching a PWOL course called Philosophy for Living. The course uses modules focused on different historical philosophical ways of life (Epicureanism, Stoicism, Confucianism, Existentialism, etc.) to engage students in exploring how philosophy can be a way of life and how its methods, virtues, and ideas can improve their own lives. We describe and compare our experiences with two central aspects of our approach: engagement with diversity and the use of immersive experiences and (...) assignments. In particular, we discuss how we recognize and center various forms of diversity in philosophy—cultural and gender diversity, but also diversity in how and in what forms philosophy can be done and what “philosophy as a way of life” can be. We also examine how the experimental and experiential aspects of immersive assignments promote deeper understanding and create possibilities for personal transformation. (shrink)

I argue that current discussions of the epistemological significance of reflection have entangled concerns about reflection with agential concerns. I begin by showing that a central strand of internalist criticism finds externalism unsatisfactory because it fails to provide a particular kind of self-knowledge, knowledge about the epistemic status of one’s own beliefs. Identifying this internalist motivation as the desire for a kind of self-knowledge opens up new possibilities and suggests new conceptual resources. I employ one of these resources—Richard Moran’s distinction (...) between the theoretical stance and the deliberative stance—to locate two types of reflection: mere reflective awareness of one’s attitudes and agent-awareness of one’s attitudes. I then examine Ernest Sosa’s account of the importance of reflection, showing how Moran’s distinction brings out the centrality of agential concerns in Sosa’s argument for reflective knowledge. I also consider briefly its relevance to fully apt knowledge. While I focus on Sosa’s epistemology, the point extends to internalism more generally. (shrink)

Sofern man die Existenz objektiver Erkenntnisse anerkennt, ist man mit der Frage nach den Bedingungen der Möglichkeit für diese Erkenntnisse konfrontiert. Der Grund muss in Voraussetzungen liegen, die selbst wiederum empirisch nicht zu rechtfertigen sind. Zwar verwerfen Popper und Carnap den Begriff des "synthetischen Urteils a priori", doch die Voraussetzung, dass es "in der Natur gesetzlich zugeht", räumen beide ein. Diese empirisch nicht zu rechtfertigende Prämisse ist ein synthetisches Urteil a priori. Gemäß Kant ist innerhalb der Klasse der Erkenntnisse a (...) priori zwischen reinen und nicht-reinen Erkenntnissen a priori zu unterscheiden. Es in vorliegender Arbeit argumentativ dafür plädiert, Naturgesetze als apriorische Erkenntnisse zu betrachten, die der Klasse der nicht-reinen synthetischen Urteile a priori zuzurechnen sind. Vor diesem Hintergrund kommt die Arbeit zu der Schlussthese: Ein empirischer (d. h. empirische Begriffe enthaltender) Satz (etwa ein Naturgesetz) kann über den (empirisch nicht einlösbaren, aber als Postulat durchaus sinnvollen) Anspruch auf allgemeine und notwendige Geltung verfügen und somit Bedingungen der Möglichkeit für objektive Erkenntnis formulieren. Doch sind für die Entdeckung empirischer Sätze mit Anspruch auf allgemeine und notwendige Geltung empirische Studien (etwa das physikalische Experiment) erforderlich. (shrink)

The problem of synthetic judgements touches on the question of whether philosophy can draw independent statements about reality in the first place. For Kant, the synthetic judgements a priori formulate the conditions of the possibility for objectively valid knowledge. Despite the principle fallibility of its statements, modern science aims for objective knowledge. This gives the topic of synthetic a priori unbroken currency. This paper aims to show that a modernized version of transcendental philosophy, if it is to be feasible at (...) all, must “bid farewell” to the concept of being “free of empiricism” or the “purity” of the a priori. Approaches to this end can already been found in Kant’s reflections on non-pure synthetic knowledge. Moreover, the a priori validity of knowledge does not exclude the possibility that it can be discovered empirically. In keeping with Kant, Fries and Nelson anticipated this separation (usually first attributed to Reichenbach) between the validity and discovery context of knowledge and pointed out that the a priori could be discovered empirically, but never proven. There are currently still good reasons why transcendental philosophical concepts are of fundamental importance for modern science, although it must not be overlooked that even within the framework of a modernized transcendental philosophy, several unsolved problems remain or are raised. For example, the irredeemability of the universal validity and necessary claims of the a priori, the problem of a clear demarcation between the phenomenal and noumenal world. Moreover, the “beautiful structure” or the Kantian system, which constituted its persuasive power, is lost. (shrink)

Economic pressures, mounting environmental, security and health requirements, are all critical factors that shape economic action. With regard to environmental protection, an economic entity acting as homo oeconomicus finds himself in a situation resembling a prisoner’s dilemma. Signposts for a possible resolution of this dilemma include an environmental management system, a system of environmental law based on the principles of environmental ethics, and a new conception of human nature.

Nelson's Proof of the Impossibility of the Theory of Knowledge -/- In addressing the possibility of a theory of knowledge, Leonard Nelson noted the contradiction of an epistemological criterion that one would require in order to differentiate between valid and invalid knowledge. Nelson concluded that the inconsistency of such a criterion proves the impossibility of the theory of knowledge. -/- Had the epistemological criterion had a perception, then it would presume to adjudicate on its own truth (thus epistemological circular argument). (...) However, if one were to assume that the criterion is not knowledge, one would then have to justify how this is a criterion for truth - yet this would only be possible when it may be considered as an object of knowledge. One would equally have had to predetermine the criterion in order to determine the truth of this knowledge, thereby providing another circular argument. Ostensibly, every criterion of truth fails at its very own test since it cannot guarantee its own truth, just as Munchausen, contrary to his assertion, could not draw himself out of the swamp by tugging on a tuft of his own hair. -/- Nelson proposed a solution of the epistemological problem (the question of the differentiation between valid and invalid knowledge), that based on Jakob Friedrich Fries' differentiation between proof and deduction. Proof, according to Nelson (in reference to Fries), can be defined as derivation of truth from one statement from another statement. Thus, from the truth in the statement that "all men are mortal", one is then able to say that "Socrates is a man" and thence extrapolate from the truth of the statement that "Socrates is mortal." If knowledge were to be considered somewhat judgmental (in a statement), then an attempt at proof (i.e. recourse to previous judgments) would inevitably lead to an infinite regression in justification, since each judgment would necessitate a further justification from another judgment. Every attempt to prove an epistemological criterion is thus also confronted by this regression in justification. -/- Nelson's attempt at a solution rests on the assumption of the existence of an immediate knowledge as a justification of the truth (mediate) of knowledge. Nelson considers immediate knowledge to be non-judgmental knowledge. These include intuitions (e. g. seeing-the-red-roof) and also philosophical knowledge that pre-exists in his opinion before a judgmental reflexion (immediate) in our reason (e. g. the principle of causality). -/- Proof of the truth of mediate knowledge can be effected by showing its compliance with attendant immediate knowledge (rational truth = correspondence of mediate knowledge with their immediate knowledge). Nelson considered this as a resolution of the circular epistemological argument. In regard to philosophical knowledge, Nelson sees these as subject to deduction and not proof. The following example illustrates the goal of deduction: -/- An approach for deducing the principle of causality: A) Every change has a cause. (The principle of causality) A´) A is a reiteration of an immediate knowledge. (Meta-assertion following A) -/- "A" may not be provable, but A´ may justified, and thus Nelson identified it as a deduction following from A. // reference: http://www.friesian.com/nelproof.htm. (shrink)

Dieser Aufsatz will zeigen, dass die Beiträge von Jakob Friedrich Fries (1773–1843) zur Psychiatrie leider (zu Unrecht) vergessen, aber überaus aktuell sind. Seine Überlegungen sowie die der Wissenschaftler, die ihm gefolgt sind, haben in den Darstellungen der Geschichte der Psychiatrie mehr Beachtung verdient.

Sektion Erkenntnistheorie, 29.09.2014, XXIII. Kongress der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Philosophie 2014 in Münster. -/- The problem of synthetic judgments touches upon the question whether philosophy is in fact capable of making independent truth statements. According to Kant, synthetic judgments formulate the conditions for the possibility of objectively valid knowledge a priori. As far as empirical attempts at reinterpretation of the aprioristic fall short of this ambition, Kant’s a priori goes deeper. This is because modern science strives towards objective knowledge, although (...) its statements are fundamentally fallible. The topic of synthetic a priori thus continues to be relevant. -/- This paper will show that, in order to be viable at all, a modernized version of transcendental philosophy must ‘depart from’ the concepts of “independence from empirics” and/or the “purity” of the aprioristic. Kant’s reflections on non-pure synthetic a priori knowledge already contain attempts at this. Furthermore, the aprioristic validity of knowledge does not exclude the possibility, that it can be discovered empirically. Fries and, subsequently, Nelson proceeded with this separation (initially ascribed to Reichenbach) between the contexts of validity and discovery of knowledge, pointing out that the a priori can indeed be discovered empirically, yet never be proven. -/- Currently, there are still a number of valid reasons for arguing that concepts from transcendental philosophy continue to be of fundamental importance for the modern sciences. However, it must not be neglected that, even within a modernized framework of transcendental philosophy various unsolved problems remain and/or are created (such as the unfeasibility of the aprioristic claim to general validity and necessity, the problem of drawing a clear boundary between the noumenal and phenomenal worlds). Moreover, the “beautiful structure” of the Kantian system, which constitutes much of its persuasive strength, is lost. (shrink)

ABSTRACT This paper argues for a version of sceptical invariantism about knowledge on which the acceptability of knowledge-attributing sentences varies with the context of assessment.

According to the scientific ideal of modernity, the propositions of science are considered fundamentally fallible. On the other hand, science strives for objective knowledge. Kant saw in the apriori the precondition for objective knowledge. But with the new conception of science the apriori (if it is not to be only logic) has become problematic. With it, however, the objectivity of scientific knowledge is at stake. As long as one grants objectivity to scientific knowledge, the question of the apriori remains topical. (...) On the one hand, this volume wants to trace the historical roots as well as the different interpretations of the apriori, and on the other hand, it wants to ask for approaches for a contemporary reinterpretation of this basic concept. (shrink)

The question of time travel stimulates the imagination and provides material for whimsical stories. A work on the topic of "time travel" forces us to deal with the concept of "time". The complexity and the antinomic character of this concept make it difficult to grasp "time" more precisely. We encounter time as a form of perception in its deeply subjective aspect, as a biological rhythm, as a social phenomenon in the sense of a collective determination of time, but also as (...) a physical quantity. Einstein's theory of relativity revolutionized our ideas of space and time. His Special Theory of Relativity (1905) allows "travel into the future" through the effect of time dilation he predicted, and Einstein's theory of gravity allows for closed time lines as solutions to its equations (e.g., Gödel cosmos, anti-de Sitter cosmos). However, traveling in a time loop would immediately lead to a number of paradoxes (e.g., grandfather paradox, information paradox). Although, surprisingly, the basic laws of physics (apart from extremely rare and macroscopically non-appearing quantum mechanical effects) would not be violated in a time reversal, there seems to be a fundamental prohibition of traveling into the past in nature. (shrink)

The question of time travel stimulates the imagination and provides material for whimsical stories. A work on the topic of "time travel" forces us to deal with the concept of "time". The complexity and the antinomic character of this concept make it difficult to grasp "time" more precisely. We encounter time as a form of perception in its deeply subjective aspect, as a biological rhythm, as a social phenomenon in the sense of a collective determination of time, but also as (...) a physical quantity. Einstein's theory of relativity revolutionized our ideas of space and time. His Special Theory of Relativity (1905) allows "travel into the future" through the effect of time dilation he predicted, and Einstein's theory of gravity allows for closed time lines as solutions to its equations (e.g., Gödel cosmos, anti-de Sitter cosmos). However, traveling in a time loop would immediately lead to a number of paradoxes (e.g., grandfather paradox, information paradox). Although, surprisingly, the basic laws of physics (apart from extremely rare and macroscopically non-appearing quantum mechanical effects) would not be violated in a time reversal, there seems to be a fundamental prohibition of traveling into the past in nature. (shrink)

Stephen Hawking claims: Philosophy is dead! Natural scientists use terms like 'natural law', 'matter', 'nature' and 'theories'. Often these terms are taken for granted without reflection. The task of philosophy of science as a metatheory of science is to clarify these terms. In doing so, philosophy of science is confronted with epistemological, ontological and metaphysical questions. But it also deals with questions such as "How do we define the boundaries between different scientific disciplines?" or "How do we distinguish science from (...) pseudoscience?". In addition, philosophy of science deals with ethical problems of modern technology, with methodological issues, with reconstructing the structure and development of scientific theories, and with exposing ideological paternalism of science. The optimistic conclusion is: Philosophy is not dead - but philosophers must discuss with scientists on an equal footing. (shrink)

Natural experiments are an increasingly popular research design in political science. This popularity raises a number of questions. First, what are natural experiments and why are they appealing? Second, what makes a good natural experiment? And finally, are natural experiments able to provide resources for knowledge production that other methodologies cannot or do not provide? Using Mary Morgan’s and Thad Dunning’s recent work on natural experiments, I offer answers to the first two questions and use the analysis to argue that (...) natural experiments highlight features of knowledge production that support methodological pluralism and the multiple aims of research. (shrink)

This Thesis engages with contemporary philosophical controversies about the nature of dispositional properties or powers and the relationship they have to their non-dispositional counterparts. The focus concerns fundamentality. In particular, I seek to answer the question, ‘What fundamental properties suffice to account for the manifest world?’ The answer I defend is that fundamental categorical properties need not be invoked in order to derive a viable explanation for the manifest world. My stance is a field-theoretic view which describes the world as (...) a single system comprised of pure power, and involves the further contention that ‘pure power’ should not be interpreted as ‘purely dispositional’, if dispositionality means potentiality, possibility or otherwise unmanifested power or ability bestowed upon some bearer. The theoretical positions examined include David Armstrong’s Categoricalism, Sydney Shoemaker’s Causal Theory of Properties, Brian Ellis’s New Essentialism, Ullin Place’s Conceptualism, Charles Martin’s and John Heil’s Identity Theory of Properties and Rom Harré’s Theory of Causal Powers. The central concern of this Thesis is to examine reasons for holding a pure-power theory, and to defend such a stance. This involves two tasks. The first requires explaining what plays the substance role in a pure-power world. This Thesis argues that fundamental power, although not categorical, can be considered ontologically-robust and thus able to fulfil the substance role. A second task—answering the challenge put forward by Richard Swinburne and thereafter replicated in various neo-Swinburne arguments—concerns how the manifestly qualitative world can be explained starting from a pure-power base. The Light-like Network Account is put forward in an attempt to show how the manifest world can be derived from fundamental pure power. (shrink)

Progress in addiction science is hampered by disagreements and ambiguity around its core construct: addiction. Addiction Ontology (AddictO) offers a path to a solution of the kind that has addressed similar problems in other areas of science: a set of clearly and uniquely defined entities to which terms such as ‘addiction’, addictive disorder’ and ‘substance dependence ’can be applied for ease of reference while recognizing that it is the construct definitions and their unique IDs that are central, not the terms.

In this paper, I endorse the idea that age is a defensible criterion for eligibility to vote, where age is itself a proxy for having a broad set of cognitive and motivational capacities. Given the current (and defeasible) state of developmental research, I suggest that the age of 16 is a good proxy for such capacities. In defending this thesis, I consider alternative and narrower capacity conditions while drawing on insights from a parallel debate about capacities and age requirements in (...) the criminal law. I also argue that the expansive capacity condition I adopt satisfies a number of powerful and complementary rationales for voting eligibility, and conclude by addressing challenging arguments that, on the one hand, capacity should not underlie voting eligibility in the first place, and, on the other, that capacity should do so directly and not via any sort of proxy, including age. (shrink)

Action research serves a pivotal purpose in enhancing educational practices as well as the achievement of students, as teachers can now take a more proactive role in the process. Success in action research initiatives depends on the self-efficacy of teacher researchers, their capability to handle their research roles, and the challenges they experience in initiating action research. This study looked into the research self-efficacy, productivity, and the issues the teachers face in conducting action research in one school district in the (...) Philippines. Data were collected through interviews with eight teacher-researchers. Findings show the tendency of less self-efficacy in the teachers’ research activities caused by inadequate research time due to their demands for teaching and poor self-confidence in engaging in research. Teachers experienced work overload, compounding the problem of observing time for research activities. They also lack sufficient funding for action research and institutional support from schools to help facilitate it. To address such challenges and warrant the participation of the teachers in research, there is a need for improved work schedules and a boost in institutional support for capacitating teachers. (shrink)

This document presents the Bonn PRINTEGER Consensus Statement: Working with Research Integrity—Guidance for research performing organisations. The aim of the statement is to complement existing instruments by focusing specifically on institutional responsibilities for strengthening integrity. It takes into account the daily challenges and organisational contexts of most researchers. The statement intends to make research integrity challenges recognisable from the work-floor perspective, providing concrete advice on organisational measures to strengthen integrity. The statement, which was concluded February 7th 2018, provides guidance on (...) the following key issues: § 1.Providing information about research integrity § 2.Providing education, training and mentoring § 3.Strengthening a research integrity culture § 4.Facilitating open dialogue § 5.Wise incentive management § 6.Implementing quality assurance procedures § 7.Improving the work environment and work satisfaction § 8.Increasing transparency of misconduct cases § 9.Opening up research § 10.Implementing safe and effective whistle-blowing channels § 11.Protecting the alleged perpetrators § 12.Establishing a research integrity committee and appointing an ombudsperson § 13.Making explicit the applicable standards for research integrity. (shrink)

The rapid expansion of Big Tech companies into various societal domains (e.g., health, education, and agriculture) over the past decade has led to increasing concerns among governments, regulators, scholars, and civil society. While existing theoretical frameworks—often revolving around privacy and data protection, or market and platform power—have shed light on important aspects of Big Tech expansionism, there are other risks that these frameworks cannot fully capture. In response, this editorial proposes an alternative theoretical framework based on the notion of sphere (...) transgressions, which draws on political philosopher Michael Walzer's theory of justice. The editorial not only introduces the sphere transgressions framework, but it also highlights its potential to generate novel research questions. Furthermore, this editorial introduces eight articles and one commentary from a group of interdisciplinary scholars that critically examine Big Tech expansionism by reflecting on this expansionism from the perspective of different societal spheres or by engaging with the sphere transgressions framework itself. (shrink)

The COVID-19 pandemic revealed numerous weaknesses in pandemic preparedness and response, including underfunding, inadequate surveillance, and inequitable distribution of countermeasures. To overcome these weaknesses for future pandemics, WHO released a zero draft of a pandemic treaty in February, 2023, and subsequently a revised bureau's text in May, 2023. COVID-19 made clear that pandemic prevention, preparedness, and response reflect choices and value judgements. These decisions are therefore not a purely scientific or technical exercise, but are fundamentally grounded in ethics. The latest (...) treaty draft reflects these ethical considerations by including a section entitled Guiding Principles and Approaches. Most of these principles are ethical—they establish core values that undergird the treaty. Unfortunately, the treaty draft's set of principles are numerous, overlapping, and show inadequate coherence and consistency. We propose two improvements to this section of the draft pandemic treaty. First, key guiding ethical principles should be clearer and more precise than they currently are. Second, the link between ethical principles and policy implementation should be clearly established and define boundaries on acceptable interpretation, ensuring that signatories abide by these principles. (shrink)

Indigenous people (IP) have faced multiple difficulties in education. Indigenous students often do worse academically than non-indigenous student peers. These stated the low enrollment rates showed a dropout rate, absenteeism, repetition rates, literacy rate, and thus the educational outcomes, with retention and completion being two significant issues. Further, this study explores the lived experiences and challenges faced by indigenous high school students amidst the new normal education. Employing the Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis, the findings of this study were: (1) The reason (...) why IP learners were not satisfied with their performance is that they cannot understand some of the lessons due to the language barrier. (2) IP learners are committed to finishing their studies, however, some of the students lack resources for studying, like gadgets for researching, and they do not have cell phones. And the other students may have gadgets or cellphones, but their internet connection is low or not accessible in some places at their location. (shrink)

This document presents the Bonn PRINTEGER Consensus Statement: Working with Research Integrity—Guidance for research performing organisations. The aim of the statement is to complement existing instruments by focusing specifically on institutional responsibilities for strengthening integrity. It takes into account the daily challenges and organisational contexts of most researchers. The statement intends to make research integrity challenges recognisable from the work-floor perspective, providing concrete advice on organisational measures to strengthen integrity. The statement, which was concluded February 7th 2018, provides guidance on (...) the following key issues: § 1. Providing information about research integrity§ 2. Providing education, training and mentoring§ 3. Strengthening a research integrity culture§ 4. Facilitating open dialogue§ 5. Wise incentive management§ 6. Implementing quality assurance procedures§ 7. Improving the work environment and work satisfaction§ 8. Increasing transparency of misconduct cases§ 9. Opening up research§ 10. Implementing safe and effective whistle-blowing channels§ 11. Protecting the alleged perpetrators§ 12. Establishing a research integrity committee and appointing an ombudsperson§ 13. Making explicit the applicable standards for research integrity. (shrink)

This essay examines antiracist feminist writing and activist oral histories, finding in these scholars' and organizers' attention to the role of spirit in their work an approach it names “loving criticism.” Loving criticism seeks knowledge that does something besides expose the truth of oppression. It seeks to amplify kindness, creativity, love, and joy wherever it can find it, so that the critic, activist, and the world can draw on these resources. Love leads us to bring old knowledges into our work (...) and to find common ground with those whom we protest and criticize. Through loving criticism, we look for and encourage the best in others and ourselves, trusting that nourishing our creative parts is intrinsically good. Love helps us find alternatives to oppositional thinking and violence so that we can create deep, lasting change. (shrink)

Taking seriously the task of sustaining the democratic project requires debunking pessimism, thinking critically about what constitutes the distinctive character of democracy, and taking a future-oriented perspective on democratic transformations.

For several years the authors have been working in Detroit with grassroots coalitions resisting Emergency Management. In this essay, we focus on how community groups in Detroit and Flint advanced common struggles for clean, safe, affordable water as a human right, particularly during the period of 2014 to 2016. We explore how, through a series of direct interventions – including public meetings and international gatherings, independent journalism and social media, community-based research projects, and citizen-led policy initiatives – these groups contributed (...) to challenging neoliberal governance, to undermining the legitimacy of state officials and their policies, and to shifting public consciousness around the human right to water. (shrink)

This study investigates the dynamics of brick-and-mortar versus click-and-mortar microbusinesses, focusing on the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats (SWOT) within the local context of Balayan. Ten purposively sampled microbusiness entrepreneurs were examined using the SWOT method. The findings underscore the significance of product assessment, communication, and customer experiences in cultivating trust. Sensory experiences and competitive pricing emerge as strengths, while challenges such as poor sales necessitate strategic interventions. External factors, particularly technological advancements, exert influence on the retail landscape. Key strategies (...) include competitive pricing, flexibility, and an understanding of customer behavior. The study highlights growth potential in tailored experiences but acknowledges the risks posed by e-commerce competition. Additionally, a SWOT strategic plan is developed to leverage internal and external strengths and opportunities while mitigating weaknesses and threats. (shrink)